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INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM:
THE STAKES FOR CRITICAL LEGAL
THEORY
ELIZABETH S. ANKER* & JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN**
On September 17, 2020, Donald Trump spoke at the socalled “White House Conference on American History.”1 The
conference mission, Trump explained, was to “clear away the
twisted web of lies” propagated by “the left.” As Trump saw it,
the problem wasn’t only that “left-wing mobs have torn down
statutes of our founders, desecrated our memorials, and carried
out a campaign of violence and anarchy.”2 The challenge for
historians was deeper, since “the left has warped, distorted,
and defiled the American story with deceptions, falsehoods,
and lies.”3 In order to demystify these ideological poisons,
Trump charged historians with the task of standing up against
the toxic propaganda machine of—wait for it—critical race theory, a “Marxist doctrine holding that America is a wicked and
racist nation.”4 Teaching the doctrines of critical theory, Trump
explained, was “a form of child abuse in the truest sense of
those words.”5 On January 18, 2021,6 Trump’s Advisory 1776

*Associate Professor of English and Associate Member of the Law Faculty, Cornell
University.
**Director, Center for Critical Thought, and Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.
1. Remarks by President Trump at the White House Conference on American
History, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Sept. 17, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpwhite-house-conference-american-history/ [https://perma.cc/SL59-ABXE].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Which, of course, fell on the Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday.

946

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

Commission doubled down.7 Dedicated to helping young people
“understand the history and principles of the founding of the
United States,”8 the Commission expanded Trump’s earlier attacks on critical race theory, including the more general terrain
of critical theory writ large.9 Naming the Frankfurt School as
the intellectual source for what would later become critical race
theory, the Commission Report argued that critical theory’s
brand of identity politics begins by entrenching the racial and
sexual identities of American citizens, proceeds to rank-order
these “racial and social groups . . . with disproportionate moral
worth allotted to each,” and concludes by demanding atonement and punishment in perpetuity for “America.”10 Notably,
the Commission seemed fully aware that it was assigning to
critical theory the very same intellectual maneuvers of a racial
ideology that had once helped justify American slavery. Its Report spelled out that logic:
In portraying America as racist and white supremacist,
identity politics advocates follow Lincoln’s great rival, Stephen A. Douglas, who wrongly claimed that American government “was made on the white basis” “by white men, for
the benefit of white men.” Indeed, there are uncanny similarities between 21st century activists of identity politics and
19th century apologists for slavery.11

In a seemingly parallel universe, in the summer of 2020
the University of Colorado established a new interdisciplinary
research center, its Center for Critical Thought.12 Modeled after similar efforts like Columbia’s Center for Contemporary
Critical Thought,13 these Centers embody the alleged webs of
lies and ideological distortions that so vex the likes of Trump
and his allies. As engines for the study of critical theory, they
7. THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, THE 1776 REPORT (2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ThePresidents-Advisory-1776-Commission-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ALWUX36].
8. Id. at 1.
9. See id. at 30.
10. Id. at 29.
11. Id.
12. CTR.
FOR
CRITICAL
THOUGHT,
https://www.colorado.edu/center
/criticalthought/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A8LC-7WHF].
13. COLUM.
CTR.
FOR
CONTEMP.
CRITICAL
THOUGHT,
https://
cccct.law.columbia.edu/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/45FQ-48GC].
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disseminate the very histories aimed at exposing deep structures of subjugation, domination, and exploitation that the
Presidential Commission spectralizes as existential threats to
the fabric of the American way of life. There are, of course,
many fascinating features about the unfolding debate (if “debate” is really the right word here). But what merits our present focus is this: What has happened in the sociocultural climate when a “Presidential Commission” finds it perfectly
justifiable to condemn teachers of critical theory, but without
supporting that view with anything resembling academic credentials, citations, sources, or arguments? What does it mean
when an official commission offers a caricatured display of
“ideology-critique” designed to demystify critical theory itself?
What are we to do with critical theory when it has seemingly
devolved into such a state that it can be facilely coopted by
Trump’s cronies? How did we get here, and perhaps more importantly, where does critical theory go in the future?
One starting point is to blame social media. On the one
hand, in its grandeur the web grants an everlasting license for
critique. In the low stakes of the Twitterverse, users like
Trump have capitalized on this license to slash and burn, purporting to show truth to power. On the other hand, it is precisely this explosion of perspectives, information, viewpoints, facts,
and everything else that has drummed up a background hum of
false equivalences. For so many of us, media saturation can
seem to induce paralysis of judgment—or the curious reverse,
judgement without reflection, unrelenting criticism predicated
on an absence of thought. Either we cannot decide, or we have
already decided.
This combination of “critical license” with media overload
churns out a popular skepticism always on the ready to “debunk.” But debunk what, exactly? And more importantly, what
does this mean for academic expertise, including the spirit of
critique long espoused by critical theory? Most immediately,
the omnipresent skepticism, ideological warfare, and shrillness
of public debate all suggest a wholesale lack of a clear and coherent understanding of what genuine criticism should be
(whatever that might be). But at the same time, the dominant
response from intellectuals has been predictable: to assault the
debunking of facts with more rounds of facts. Scientists respond to climate skepticism and anti-vaxxers with data, all in
the hopes of triumphing in the battle between fact and fiction.
Watchdog groups subject misleading and false claims by politi-
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cians to rigorous “fact-checking.” Journalists fend off accusations of bias by diligently representing “both sides” of an issue.
And yet, these appeals to “what is really going on” can feel
fruitless.
But from another point of departure, it is not so clear that
greater critical distance and detachment will help us confront
this apparent crisis in our very ability to think. Because the
current mood of rampant debunking can seem to breed cavalier
indifference not only to facts per se but also to the sorts of values and commitments necessary to orient principled political
action and debate. Perhaps criticism instead needs to better
theorize its relationship to praxis, or even to undertake the difficult labor of proposing, affirming, and defending substantive
ideals that might help us remake our existing social structures.
For instance, it goes without saying that the war on facts has
led to an erosion of collective trust, so perhaps one task for critical theory is to devote itself to the rebuilding of public trust in
civic discourse and process.
Yet however one responds to our present situation, there is
no question that it demands a revitalization of critical practice.
If the very idea of critique has become fraught—if not fully mutilated with misuse—what future can we hope for critical theory? Needless to say, citing to the so-called crisis in truth is
merely one way to account for the unprecedented challenges
facing critique in the present. The essays that follow offer a collection of varying explanations for this current juncture—
including proposals for how we might negotiate it. Just as this
issue’s contributors differ in their assessments, they similarly
arrive at competing answers to the matter of how critical legal
thought should respond. Similarly, although recent years have
newly exposed the seeming fragility of many bulwarks of democracy, the rule of law, and civic reason, many underlying
factors that enabled the Trump presidency long precede his
election. As such, it is imperative to take the long view of both
our contemporary geopolitical moment and the many traditions
of critical thinking practiced within the academy and beyond.
Over the last decades of the twentieth century, critical theory and its offshoots spread throughout the humanities and beyond, ranging from the law school to the music school and everywhere in between. No doubt exists over that tradition’s
sweeping range of influence, and if anything the 1776 Commission ironically only confirms that diagnostic authority. But how
should we historicize critique? Given the specter of authoritari-
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anism, it is certainly tempting to draw parallels with the era
that give birth to the Frankfurt School, for some suggesting an
onus to return to those roots. But those mid-century origins of
theory have since developed in countless unexpected directions,
merging with other philosophical schools and flowering into a
rich and diverse intellectual formation. One active debate on
the table therefore lies with the status of those many modes of
conducting theory, including their varying usefulness and relevance to divergent fields within the academy. For instance
within cultural and literary theory, some have asked about the
potential trajectories of post-critique.14 But does post-critique
make sense in the context of the legal academy? Critical theory
has surely never been mainstreamed to the same extent as
within other humanities and social science disciplines, so might
critical legal theory still be in its adolescence?
From another angle, recent disregard for the rule and institutions of law might seem to suggest that critique can no
longer be claimed as the exclusive province of the progressive
left. Reactionary political actors have learned to weaponize the
tools of critique, among other things enlisting relativism and
denialism to shore up right-wing agendas. This syndrome becomes especially vivid with regard to the critiques of law historically associated with a primarily left or progressive stance.
It has been a frequent premise of critical theory that “legalism,” far from being neutral, represents an inherently “liberal”
if not right-wing ideology—and that unflagging allegiance to
the institutions, doctrines, procedures, and rule of law in general will camouflage as well as rationalize structures of injustice and oppression. These baseline assumptions have organized much critical legal theory. However, reactionary politics
today can appear to adopt a polar opposite stance toward law
and legalism, instead laying active siege to the very institutions long presumed to be structural supports reinforcing the
status quo and its patterns of exclusion. Far from a strictly leftist strategy, critiquing and undermining the rule of law has
thus become a frequent ruse among the right. But these recognitions beg the question of how critical legal theory should approach this changing ideological landscape. Is it imperative for
critical legal thinkers to shed a certain brand of skepticism and
instead embrace the very legal principles, norms, and institutions long inspiring critique?
14.

See, e.g., RITA FELSKI, THE LIMITS OF CRITIQUE (2015).
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This shifting ideological terrain crystallizes the sorts of
tensions confronted by the essays that follow. Many contributors to this Symposium accordingly ask whether the targets of
critique should remain the same, or instead whether progressive legal theory should focus on new, different objectives and
goals. For instance, the status of political economy within critical legal theory occupies multiple contributions, although their
authors arrive at different conclusions. For Chris Tomlins, critical legal theorists have been too quick to cabin Marx and his
influence. Tomlins therefore advocates a revitalized investment
in Marx and his specific critiques of political economy. In contrast, Richard Ford cautions that not all attention to political
economy is inherently helpful. In particular, many contemporary theorists have been overly preoccupied with “neoliberalism,” aggrandizing that phenomena and thereby assigning it
with disproportionate analytic weight.
Other contributors venture alternate frameworks for mapping the distinctive landscape of our current geopolitical crossroads. While examining the enduring connection between critique and crisis, Ben Golder grapples with both a mood of
growing desperation and the seductiveness of crisis as a mindset mirroring our contemporary moment. For Golder, the present is unparalleled precisely because the very existence of critique faces heightened jeopardy. Both Aziza Ahmed and
Marianne Constable similarly contend with perceptions of escalating crisis due to mounting dangers to the public sphere and
civic exchange. For Ahmed, there is a need to reexamine the relation between law, science, and expertise, including to question the frequently ambivalent attitude toward truth and “expertise” within radical social movements. Constable instead
focuses on the diminishing reliability of public speech. Although that erosion of civic discourse is a byproduct of relatively
unprecedented recent phenomena, Constable submits that the
critical theory canon nevertheless contains resources for addressing that crisis. As Constable shows, J.L. Austin’s famed
lectures on speech act theory can help us understand the capacity of utterances to “go wrong,” mutating from “promises” into
“threats.”
As some of the following essays argue, our current era renders it imperative to better define critique, including to delineate its boundaries from other genres of thought. Perhaps not
surprisingly, however, those contributors single out a number
of different methodological impulses and objectives. For in-
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stance, Jorge L. Esquirol studies the stock repertoire of recurring “critical moves” that have organized progressive legal
scholarship. In taxonomizing those standard moves, Esquirol
simultaneously asks whether they have at times rendered critical theory overly formulaic and insufficiently attuned to context. Enlisting the lessons of comparative legal study, Esquirol
ventures a plea for greater attention to the sociopolitical effects
of those staples of critique.
In this respect, there is a growing importance for left critique to distinguish itself from the sorts of cavalier naysaying
and subterfuge that have ravaged democratic discourse and
participation. But at the same time, critical legal theory confronts a parallel onus to justify its differences from more moderate or centrist political agendas as well as intellectualrhetorical modes. Leti Volpp thus compares two contrasting
immigration policy statements—the Immigration Platform of
the Biden campaign and the “Migrant Justice Platform”—in
order to highlight the troubling assumptions that can underlie
liberal reform agendas. Unlike the Biden agenda, the Migrant
Justice Platform models collectivist, grassroots practices of critique, underscoring the ongoing value of a progressive commitment to a principled criticism.
Seeking to distinguish progressive critique from mainstream legal reasoning, Charles Barzun argues that critical
theory can be identified by its “holistic” approach aimed at
analysis that is inextricably explanatory and normative. What
this means is that critical legal thinkers should recognize their
affinity with scholars who have at times been dismissed among
the left (Barzun’s example is Catherine MacKinnon). At once, it
is this holistic orientation that renders critical theory especially well equipped to analyze the common law. Analogously, Paulo Barrozo maintains that critical legal thought must separate
itself from the brands of critique practiced in conventional legal
scholarship, given how that tradition has served to operationalize liberalism as an ideology. Barrozo instead promotes a jurisprudence of distribution, which can be conceptualized vis-à-vis
a set of elements like “epistemic confidence” and the “evaluation of means.”
Peter Gable and Peter Goodrich both offer historical accounts of critical legal theory and its evolution—although they
emphasize contrasting elements of that tradition. For Gabel,
both the Marxist and Critical Legal Studies variants of critical
theory generate accounts of “alienation” that are incomplete

952

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

without attention to intersubjective desires for recognition.
Gabel argues that those social interconnections can prove
transformatively dis-alienating, just as they are frequently
harnessed within radical social movements. In a similar spirit,
Goodrich also seizes upon the energetic style of critical legal
theory, celebrating that vitalism and the process of just becoming it can inspire. For Goodrich, the roots of theory must therefore be located in performative musicality and poetics: in what
he terms “the jurisliterary.”
Other contributions to this Symposium apply theory to
contemplate specific legal issues and debates, exemplifying the
work of critical legal scholarship in practice. For instance, Mikhail Xifaras develops a “theory of legal characters” designed to
distill the diverse attitudes of varying legal actors toward the
legal system. Expanding on the frequent analogy between law
and theater, Xifaras demonstrates the many ways that legal
actors’ choices and behavior are inherently mediated. Here, the
context of the French Constitutional Council offers a case study
through which Xifaras illustrates the more global implications
of his theory.
Bernard Harcourt instead looks to theoretical debates
about rights in order to illustrate certain blind spots afflicting
much critical legal theory. As Harcourt argues, theorists have
tended either to critique rights by mistakenly reducing them to
purely instrumental tools or to philosophically account for the
promise of rights in ways that sever them from actual legal
practice. For Harcourt, rights therefore exemplify both the frequent disconnect between theoria and praxis and the need for a
constant confrontation between those domains.
Finally, while pedagogy is a theme informing many essays
in this Symposium, Chantal Thomas and Daniel J. Sequeira
inquire centrally into the role of the law school classroom in
forging a critical mindset. In her essay, Thomas defends the
role of critical theory within the law school classroom, canvassing influential critiques of legal education ventured by thinkers
including Duncan Kennedy, Kim Crenshaw, and Karl Klare.
Simultaneously reflecting on her own experience as a student
as well as professor, Thomas offers an example from her 1L
Contracts syllabus to illustrate how curriculum might be revised in ways designed to facilitate structural critiques of racism. For Sequeira, by contrast, the forms of “unsettling” intrinsic to critical legal analysis necessarily occur beyond the
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classroom’s purview, in spaces exempt from the homogenizing
gravitational pull of a formal legal education.
The essays that follow all differently reflect on the stakes
for critical legal theory. Yet while drawing varying assessments, this Symposium’s contributors all agree that those
stakes could not be higher: that the project of critical legal theory is as urgent as ever. In such a spirit does this Symposium
set out to rethink that project, with simultaneous reference to
its past, present, and future.

